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SUBJECT: CHAD: EUFOR PROSPECTS GLOOMY

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**¶11.** (SBU) Summary: Cancellation or postponement of EUFOR due to resource and logistics constraints is a possibility according to EUFOR's General Gannacia. Nonetheless, EUFOR and MINURCAT advance teams continue to lay the groundwork for eventual deployment. MINURCAT may request assistance from donors in overcoming obstacles with the Chadian government. End summary.

**¶12.** (SBU) EUFOR's General Gannacia made a two day visit to Chad to view EUFOR preparations in N'Djamena and Abeche. In a meeting December 12 with DCM, he informed her that EUFOR might have to be canceled due to lack of funding for field operations and lack of air support. Even if support materialized, the operation might be postponed until December 2008 if the operation could not deploy sufficiently ahead of the start of the next rainy season (which begins in May). Ganaccia explained that he could live with a force of 3,000 rather than the hoped for 4,500, but he needed funding in order to contract logisticians, field engineers, etc. And he needed helicopters for quick reaction capability in order to successfully patrol Chad's vast eastern region. For its part, France had stated that it would not exceed the amount already pledged. For other Europeans, Ganaccia considered the problem to be lack of political will, rather than resources. The UK and Germany, in particular, were not interested in seeing a European defense force succeed.

**¶13.** (SBU) Ganaccia was confident that EUFOR's mission was achievable - even with the recent insecurity in the east - although it would have been preferable to have been up and running before the rebel incursions began. EUFOR would deter attacks on IDPs, refugees and humanitarian operations and provide force protection to the UN-trained gendarme force (MINURCAT). He would consider the mission a success if IDPs returned home. EUFOR would not interfere with Chadian rebel movements if they did not threaten these groups (they would, however, pass on intelligence of their movements to the Chadian authorities.) He discounted the threats from Chadian rebels that EUFOR might be considered a "belligerent force" and therefore a legitimate target. In his words, "let them try."

**¶14.** (SBU) Ganaccia said that the relationship with the UN force, MINURCAT was proceeding well. Both sides had a good idea as to how EUFOR would go about supporting and protecting MINURCAT. Agreement had been reached on common warning systems and "direct intervention circumstances" EUFOR would have intelligence cells co-located with MINURCAT in their six presence towns (Abeche, Iriba, Guereda, Goz Beida, Bahai and Farchana.)

15. (SBU) Ganaccia also felt that relations with the Chadian authorities were good, with a high degree of cooperation. He noted, however, that they particularly interested in ensuring that this would be just a one year mission, with no UN follow-on force. An assessment is mandated in UN Security Resolution 1788 at the six months mark. But the six months mark was still unknown given the uncertainty as to the start date.

#### MINURCAT PREPARATIONS

16. (SBU) MINURCAT officers gave a well-prepared briefing to members of the diplomatic corps on December 12 on status of preparations (largely recapitulating information provided by MINURCAT head to DAS Fitzgerald reftel). MINURCAT will have six police commissariats in the towns of Abeche, Iriba, Guereda, Goz Beida, Bahai and Farchana. They will have smaller police posts in the 12 refugee camps/IDP areas. An area of 5-10 kilometers around the camps/areas will be patrolled. They hope to begin "training of trainers" no later than December 18, with the four week training for the gendarmes completed by March. Training will include skills refresher (candidates are supposed to have spent at least two years already either in the Chadian police or gendarmerie), professionalization and human rights training. Deployment of the 850 Chadian gendarmes will take place in stages starting with Goz Beida, Djabal and Goz Amir camps, with the final deployment reaching Bahai by June. However, if EUFOR deploys sooner, MINURCAT deployment could speed up.

17. (SBU) MINURCAT will supply 214 vehicles, 900 side arms with ammunition, 507 VHF radios, uniforms, personal items, office equipment, and renovation of existing police/gendarme facilities. However, MINURCAT too is experiencing shortfalls. Only 180 police trainers (out of 300 desired) have been provided by Francophone countries to date.

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Contributions to the trust fund were lagging: the EU had contributed Euros 10 million EUROS, Japan Euros 2.2 EUROS, and Norway \$1 million, but they were still a long way from the \$20 million target. MINURCAT is also encountering problems with the Chadian government, which, among other issues, is not satisfied with the proposed stipend to be offered to the Chadian Gendarmes. MINURCAT head Campaore informed DCM that the Chadian government was pressing for international scale salaries to be paid to the Chadian gendarmes. (MINURCAT has provided for them to receive a stipend of approximately USD 300 plus \$5/day for living expenses.) Campaore explained that he would work this issue with the Chadian authorities, but might need UN members to weigh in if the government continued to reject the UN's stipend plan.

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